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Anti-ISIS Humor: Cultural Resistance of Radical Ideology
Ahmed Al-Rawi
Concordia University
ABSTRACT
After the release of ISIS’s ‘Salil Al-Sawarem’ promotional and
motivational video with its famous religious chant, hundreds of
Arab YouTubers started mocking it by editing its chant and
including it in funny dancing clips which they called ‘the popular
edition’. Also, some Arabic and Kurdish TV channels produced
shows that aimed at mocking the radical group. Since ISIS regards
dancing as a religious taboo, these popular and ofﬁcial media
productions represent a cultural resistance force and a rejection of
ISIS and its extremist ideology. I argue in this article that these
active involvements in ridiculing, countering, and discrediting the
terrorists’ ideology are cultural resistance efforts that aim at
countering terrorism and raising awareness about its dangers in
the Middle East region.
Introduction
ISIS is regarded now as one of the wealthiest and deadliest terrorist organizations on
earth.1 In its ‘Salil Al-Sawarem’ (The Clinging of the Swords) promotional videos, the
group employs highly graphic scenes and images which can be easily found on
YouTube; they mainly highlight ISIS’s savage vision of control, featuring military victories,
beheading scenes, mass killings, assassination attempts, and suicide attacks. This article
investigates the kind of cultural resistance ISIS encounters in many Middle Eastern
countries by examining a number of famous TV shows and popular YouTube videos.
In this context, it is important to refer to one of the foundations of ISIS’s extremist
ideology which is built on spreading fear. The idea is borrowed from an earlier Al-
Qaeda publication entitled ‘The Administration of Savagery’. The work was written by
a jihadist called Abu Bakr Naji and was posted online around 2004.2 The document
offers detailed predictions of the Islamic State establishment, but that in order to
achieve it, savagery and chaos must overwhelm. In this regard, acting savagely and por-
traying savagery must be continuously done and in a way justiﬁed by Islamic jurisdiction
in order to make Muslims feel vulnerable and seek the help of mujahideen to gain peace.
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1R. Windrem, ‘ISIS Is the World’s Richest Terror Group, But Spending Money Fast’, NBC News, 20 March 2015, www.nbcnews.
com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-richest-terror-group-world-n326781
2Lawrence Wright, ‘The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is Just The Beginning’, The New Yorker, 11
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Naji mentions that ‘even though the jihadis will have caused the chaos, that fact will be
forgotten as the ﬁghters impose security, provide food and medical treatment, and estab-
lish Islamic courts of justice’.3 He also asserts a media committee or division must be
established that should persuade the masses ‘to join the jihad, offer positive support,
and adopt a negative attitude toward those who do not join the ranks.4 In other words,
the target audience is the general public who must be informed about the alleged credi-
bility of ISIS’s action and its savagery, both of which must be justiﬁed based on Islamic
sharia. One example of the above view is documented back in 2012. The spokesperson
of the group, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, once participated in a meeting near Aleppo
with representatives from different Islamist factions ﬁghting in Syria in order to ﬁnd a sol-
ution to the ongoing military confrontations amongst them. An agreement was reached to
form an Islamic religious council in order to end the feuds based on Islamic law. However,
Adnani
merely looked at them disdainfully. He then said: ‘The only law I believe in is the law of the
jungle.’5
This kind of thinking is similar to that of Al-Qaeda, which routinely emphasized the fol-
lowing messages in their public communication: an Islamist Utopia, they are attacking us,
jihad is the only just response, terrorism is a legitimate tactic in jihad, and the glory of mar-
tyrdom.6 Indeed, ‘Salil Al-Sawarem’ is one of these media productions that embodies
ISIS’s vision of savagery whose goal is to create fear and promote ISIS’s brand as a frightful
group.
It is important here to closely examine the link between terrorism and propaganda
because they are connected to the overreaching concepts covered in this study. According
to Jowett and O’Donnell, propaganda refers to the ‘deliberate, systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and divert behavior to achieve a response that furthers
the desired intent of the propagandist’.7 Religious authorities and political institutions in
different times relied on media to consolidate their powers though media was also used by
opposing parties and groups to undermine the hegemony of the powerful groups. Media
can also be complicit if it promotes ‘terrorism by stressing fear and an uncertain future’.8
In this regard, G. Weimann emphasizes the link between terrorism and propaganda as
follows:
Terrorists see the media as a powerful tool in their psychological warfare. They believe that
fear and panic can be spread by the coverage of terrorist attacks. They also look at the media
as instruments of propaganda, targeting various audiences as they can create awareness (on a
global scale) of the problems and issues motivating them. They can use terrorist attacks to
promote their cause on the media agenda and thus on the public agenda, they can turn to
their own people seeking legitimacy, support, and funding and even recruit new members.
3Abu Bakr Naji, ‘The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass’, trans. William
McCants, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, 2006, https://azelin.ﬁles.wordpress.com/2010/
08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf, p. 11.
4Ibid., p. 51.
5C. Reuter, R. Salloum, and S. Shafy, ‘Digital Jihad: Inside Islamic State’s Savvy PR War’, Spiegel Online, 8 October 2014,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-professional-pr-strategies-of-isis-in-syria-and-iraq-a-995611.html
6K. Payne, ‘Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror’, Studies in Conﬂict & Terrorism, 32:2 (2009),
pp. 109–128.
7 , p. 7.
8 D.L. Altheide, ‘The Mass Media and Terrorism’, Discourse & Communication, 1:3 (2007), pp. 287–308, p. 287)
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The mass media are a valuable instrument in terrorist strategy, and consequently in terrorist
tactics too.9
Jowett and O’Donnell believe that religion and propaganda are often related since the role
of propaganda in the spread of different religions cannot be ignored. For example, they
have both ‘relied on the use of charismatic ﬁgures, heavy symbolism, a simple and inces-
sant moral philosophy, and an understanding of their audience’s needs.10 From the early
stages of ISIS’s emergence as an extremist terrorists group, it has been actively using pro-
paganda to promote its vision and goals.11 In this regard, communication, technology, and
new media are the best tools that ISIS is using to reach its public and possibly create an
impact on some audience segments.
For many decades, propaganda has been used as a resource for mobilization for many
terrorists groups and in different world regions.12 According to a number of nineteenth-
century Italian anarchists such as Errico Malatesta, Carlo Caﬁero and Emilio Covelli, ter-
rorism was understood to be ‘propaganda by the deed’.13 Another anarchist theorist called
Peter Kropotkin said that ‘By actions which compel general attention, the new idea seeps
into people’s minds and wins converts. One such act may, in a few days, make more pro-
paganda than thousand pamphlets. Above all, it awakens the spirit of revolt’.14 In other
words, ‘propaganda by the deed’ refers to the idea that only powerful or important
deeds can draw peoples’ attention to a group’s cause.15 Hence, there is always a need
for mediated violence in order for a terrorist group to thrive. Garrison asserts that the
terrorist act, in and of itself, communicates that change can occur and the violence of the act
commands the attention of the society. The propaganda effect is in the act of securing the
attention of the populous and then providing the message through the violence.16
According to Schmid,17 terrorism serves three main purposes: intimidation, blackmail and
propaganda. In fact, many scholars equate terrorism and propaganda, for they ‘are iden-
tical insofar as they both seek to inﬂuence a mass audience in a way that is intended to
beneﬁt the sponsor’.18 Another scholar believes that violence and propaganda constitute
what is known as terrorism since ‘Violence aims at behaviour modiﬁcation by coercion.
Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion.’19
9 G. Weimann, ‘The Theater of Terror: The Psychology of Terrorism and the Mass Media’, Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment
& Trauma, 9:3–4 (2005), pp. 379–390, p. 383.
10G.S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion. Sage Publications; 2014.
11J.P. Farwell, ‘The Media Strategy of ISIS’, Survival, 56:6 (2014), pp. 49–55.; T. Neer and M.E. O’Toole, ‘The Violence of the
Islamic State of Syria (ISIS): A Behavioral Perspective’, Violence and Gender, 1:4 (2014), pp. 145–156; Charlie Winter, ‘The
Virtual “Caliphate”: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy’ (Quilliam Report), July 2015, www.
quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-stat
es-propaganda-strategy.pdf
12J. Wright, Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968–86 (London: Macmillan, 1991); D.L.
Paletz and A.P. Schmid (eds) Terrorism and the Media (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 1992).
13As cited in A.H. Garrison, ‘Deﬁning Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda By Deed and Change Through Fear
and Violence’, Criminal Justice Studies, 17:3 (2004), pp. 259–279, p. 265.
14As cited in P.S. Alex, ‘Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16:2 (2004), pp. 197–221,
p. 205.
15W. Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977), p. 49.
16Garrison, op. cit., p. 265.
17A.P. Schmid, ‘Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 1:4 (1989), pp. 539–565.
18 M. Tugwell, ‘Terrorism and Propaganda: Problem and Response’, Journal of Conﬂict Studies, 6:2 (1986), pp. 5–15, p. 5)
19Alex, op. cit., p. 206.
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It is important to note here that the use of symbols is one of the deﬁning features of
terrorist acts, as Thornton stresses: ‘If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a dem-
onstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value.’20 Karber also
emphasizes that ‘terrorism can be analyzed much like other media of communication’21
due to its symbolic nature. As stated above, the terrorist act is not necessarily intended
at the victims, but rather media consumers in order to instill fear in their hearts.22 In
other words, ‘the skin on a drum [is] beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider
audience’.23 In this regard, Weimann and Winn24 introduced the concept of the theater
of terror in which they emphasized that terrorism is meant to disseminate a message by
orchestrating violence. This is originally an idea borrowed from Jenkins,25 who said
that terrorism is similar to a choreographed act that aims at attracting attention.
On the other hand, Miller and Sabir distinguish between propaganda and mere com-
munication of messages as they claim that more coercive forms of power like torture
and killing ‘can be examples of propaganda’.26 Further, Rhonda Zaharna27 mentions
that it is important to distinguish between propaganda and public diplomacy as the
former term is regarded as negative, while public diplomacy is usually run by governments
and is meant to serve some good causes. Yet, many other scholars disagree with the above
claims as both terrorism and propaganda are types of persuasive communication, and
there remains a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and mass media. ‘Each exploits
the other and terrorism has no meaning without media coverage in this age of mass com-
munication.’28 In the following section, a detailed theoretical discussion is provided on the
link between media and power and cultural resistance.
Mediated Power, Cultural Resistance and Humor
In relation to this study, a few theoretical concepts will be discussed especially the relation
between media and power as well as cultural resistance and the use of humor. Many media
and communication scholars believe that media and power are closely associated.
Anthony Giddens, for example, states that power has a transformative capacity because
it can change society. It is ‘the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in
some way to alter them’.29 In other words, power is linked to change and media can be
instrumental here in enlightening and leading people on how to enact this change. In
this regard, John B. Thompson classiﬁes power into four main forms: economic, political,
coercive, and symbolic.30 The latter involves media and communication means that is
20T.P. Thornton, ‘Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation’ in H. Eckstein (ed.) Internal War: Problems and Approaches
(New York: The Free Press. 1964), pp. 71–99, pp. 73–4.
21P. Karber, ‘Urban terrorism: Baseline data and a conceptual framework’, Social Science Quarterly, 52 (1971), pp. 527–533,
p. 529.
22Ibid.
23A. Schmid and J. de Graaf, Violence as communication (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), p. 14.
24G. Weimann and C. Winn, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism (New York: Longman, 1994).
25B. Jenkins, International Terrorism (Los Angeles: Crescent, 1975).
26D. Miller and R. Sabir, ‘Propaganda and Terrorism’ in D. Freedman and D. Thussu (eds) Media & Terrorism: Global Perspec-
tives (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2012), pp. 77–94, p. 79.
27R.S. Zaharna, ‘From Propaganda To Public Diplomacy in the Information Age’ in N. Snow and Y. Kamalipour (eds) War,
Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective (New York: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2004), pp. 219–225.
28L.J. Martin, ‘The Media’s Role In International Terrorism’, Studies in Conﬂict & Terrorism, 8:2 (1986), pp. 127–146, p. 127.
29A. Giddens, The Nation-state and Violence, Vol. 2 (Oakland: University of California Press, 1985), p. 7.
30John Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 12–18.
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used to exert inﬂuence and possibly control over others. As far as ISIS is concerned, the
group seems to employ all these forms in varying manners and levels. Further and in
relation to the symbolic power mentioned above, Fiske distinguishes between two types
of power: semiotic and social. The ﬁrst one is the power to ‘construct meanings, pleasures,
and social identities, and the power to construct a socioeconomic system’.31 Media can be
regarded as a symbolic and semiotic form of power because of its role in shaping reality in
the minds of people. Nick Couldry further elaborates here by stressing that media is a
complicated social process because of its ‘symbolic power of ‘constructing reality’ (both
factual representations and credible ﬁctions)’.32 Indeed, media is regarded as an emergent
social power because the infrastructure of our modern society ‘depends increasingly on the
fast circulation of information and images.33 In this regard, Van Dijk elaborates by empha-
sizing that:
Media power is generally symbolic and persuasive, in the sense that the media primarily have
the potential to control to some extent the minds of readers or viewers, but not directly their
actions. Except in cases of physical, coercive force, the control of action, which is usually the
ultimate aim of the exercise of power, is generally indirect, whereas the control of intentions,
plans, knowledge, beliefs, or opinions that is, mental representations that monitor overt activi-
ties is presupposed.34
In relation to the types of media power, James Curran35 points out three main kinds of
inﬂuence: economic, political, and cultural powers. The latter refers to counter-discourses
that resist the powerful institution which could be linked to this study as different centra-
lized and non-centralized media productions in the Middle East attempt to culturally
resist ISIS’s radical ideology. In his theory of mass-self communication, Manuel Castells
argues that media ‘are not the holders of power, but they constitute by and large the
space where power is decided’.36 In other words, media outlets are used as possible vehicles
for power and counter-power. In the two cases, media can inﬂuence and have an impact
on people, and ISIS uses media to counter the messages of the mainstreammedia as well as
the general public, so this is regarded as counter-power. On the other hand, ISIS succeeds
in many ways in disseminating its messages and sometimes persuading some individuals
to join its ranks. As a result, the terrorist group will hold power over those it controls and
its new recruits. Castells explains the binary nature of power by saying that all ‘institutional
systems reﬂect power relations, as well as the limits to these power relations as negotiated
by a historical process of domination and counter-domination’.37 In this context, the line
that separate Castells’ dichotomy in terms of power and counter-power is blurred here
because power itself is continuously negotiated.
As for the concept of cultural resistance, media is used a vehicles to articulate a variety
of resistances against hegemonic institutions and groups. The term itself was ﬁrst
31J. Fiske, Television Culture (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 315.
32N. Couldry, The Place Of Media Power: Pilgrims And Witnesses Of The Media Age (New York: Psychology Press, 2000), p. 4.
33N. Couldry and J. Curran (eds) Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World (New York: Rowman &
Littleﬁeld, 2003), p. 4.
34T.A. Van Dijk, ‘Power and the News Media’ in T.A. Van Dijk and D. Paletz (eds) Political Communication and Action
(New York: Hampton Press, 1995), pp. 9–36, p. 10.
35James Curran, Media and Power (London: Routledge, 2002).
36M. Castells, ‘Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society’, International Journal of Communication,
1:1 (2007), pp. 238–266, p. 242.
37Ibid., p. 239.
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introduced in the early twentieth century, and one of the earliest works that referred to this
concept was written in 1922 by Henry Baerlein (1875–1960) on Slavic people. The author
describes the Slavs’ resistance of the German attempts to introduce Christianity into their
lands in the ninth century, emphasizing ‘the political and cultural resistance … against
the State of the Franks.38 The term itself is usually associated with foreign invasions’
attempts to change the social fabric of certain nations and the struggle of the occupied,
enslaved, or affected people to maintain their culture and traditional beliefs.39 Cultural
resistance is also used in other contexts. As Scott40 claims, cultural resistance can be man-
ifested as ‘everyday forms of resistance’ such as contesting the issues of personal identity,41
religious values and discrimination,42 gender,43 race,44 generational differences,45 and
sexual orientations.46 Among the means used to express this kind of cultural resistance
is, for example, rap music in the Cape Town area during the apartheid period47 or subal-
tern press in South Africa.48 Further, sports can also be used like playing baseball in the
Caribbean which is regarded as a form of cultural resistance against Americanization
and the inﬂuence of the dominant culture.49 Due to the colonial heritage of many
countries around the world, nationalism itself can be considered a form of cultural
resistance.50
In this article, the focus is on traditional and social media, especially YouTube,
employed as a cultural resistance tool. In general, the term is used in connection to the
rejection of imported cultural beliefs that are regarded as a threat to the society and its
people. As explained below, ISIS exerts power over many people and areas, so the
group can be regarded as hegemonic, while the efforts of the anti-ISIS groups exhibit a
form of cultural empowerment. Cultural resistance is employed to express resentment,
38Henry Baerlein, The Birth of Yugoslavia, Vol. I (London: Leonard Parsons, 1922), p. 29.
39B. Bush, ‘“The Family Tree Is Not Cut”: Women and Cultural Resistance in Slave Family Life in the British Caribbean’ in
G. Okihiro (ed.) In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afro-American History (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1986), pp. 117–132; Roger Neil Rasnake, Domination and Cultural Resistance: Authority and Power Among An Andean
People (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1988); D.E. Walker, No More, No More: Slavery and Cultural Resistance in Havana
and New Orleans (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
40J.C. Scott. Everyday Forms of Resistance. The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. 4:1 (2008 May 15), pp. 33–62.
41S. Gregory, Santeria in New York City: A Study in Cultural Resistance (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999).
42F. Colonna, ‘Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy In Colonial Algeria’, Economy and Society, 3:3 (1974), pp. 233–
252; O. Arrieta, ‘Religion and Ritual among the Tarahumara Indians of Northern Mexico: Maintenance of Cultural Auton-
omy through Resistance and Transformation of Colonizing Symbols’, Wicazo Sa Review (1992), pp. 11–23; H. Moghissi,
‘Away from Home: Iranian Women, Displacement, Cultural Resistance and Change ’, Journal of Comparative Family
Studies, 2:30 (1999), pp. 207–217.
43G. Gerbner, ‘The Dynamics of Cultural Resistance’ in G. Tuchman, A. Daniels and W. Benét (eds) Hearth and Home: Images
of Women in the Mass Media (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 46–50; K. Weingarten, Cultural Resistance:
Challenging Beliefs About Men, Women, and Therapy (London: Routledge, 2013).
44T. Rose, ‘Orality and Technology: Rap Music and Afro-American Cultural Resistance’, Popular Music & Society, 13:4 (1989),
pp. 35–44; B. Carrington, ‘Sport, Masculinity, and Black Cultural Resistance’, Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 22:3 (1998),
pp. 275–298.
45G. Yang, ‘China’s Zhiqing Generation Nostalgia, Identity, and Cultural Resistance in the 1990s’, Modern China, 29:3 (2003),
pp. 267–296.
46A. Elling, P. De Knop and A. Knoppers, ‘Gay/Lesbian Sport Clubs and Events Places of Homo–Social Bonding and Cultural
Resistance?’, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 38:4 (2003), pp. 441–456.
47D. Künzler, ‘South African Rap Music, Counter Discourses, Identity, and Commodiﬁcation Beyond the Prophets of Da City’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, 37 (2011), pp. 27–43.
48L. Switzer, ‘South Africa’s Subaltern Press: A Case Study in Reading A Cultural Text’, Ecquid novi, 19:1 (1998), pp. 66–87.
49A. Klein, A. Yiannakis and M.J. Melnick, ‘Sport and Culture as Contested Terrain: Americanization in the Caribbean’, Con-
temporary Issues in Sociology of Sport, (2001), pp. 461–465.
50Klein.
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mistrust, and animosity against the domineering culture that is represented by ISIS, and it
becomes a venue against religious discrimination.
As Colleen Roach51 mentions in her discussion of cultural imperialism and resistance,
there is also resistance of the resistance in cultural studies which can also be applied in this
study since there is always some kind of power shift; as usual, resistance is linked to the
vulnerable or disenfranchised group. In this regard, Fiske asserts that counter-powers
are ‘not just oppositions to power, but [they are] the sources of power in their own
right: they are the social points at which the powers of the subordinate are mostly
clearly expressed’.52 In this way, cultural resistance is the obvious ‘refusal to accept the
social identity proposed by the dominant ideology and the social control that goes with
it’.53 Finally, these counter-power movements can be manifested as a local, national,
regional, and even international movement. In this context, Mittleman refers to the trans-
national or regional scope of some anti-hegemonic movements in terms of having ‘collec-
tive resistance transcending national borders.54 Based on the examples provided below, the
anti-ISIS mocking videos and shows clearly have regional and international scope and
audiences.
In addition, cultural resistance is manifested in the use of mediated humor. In particu-
lar, dark humor and satire seem relevant here. In relation to the former, it treats a morbid
topic such as ISIS and its mediated savagery in an entertaining and funny manner. During
and after times of crisis, human beings tend to express their fears in sometimes humorous
ways such as the case of popular culture in post 9/11 America.55 For this article, I bor-
rowed Sorensen’s deﬁnition of humor which ‘means everything that causes amusement,
from a joke, story, play, skit, movie or book, to a way of acting or a slogan in a demon-
stration. It can be based on irony, satire, parody, or ridicule.56 In fact, humor, especially
dark comedy, has been employed from the beginning of time in political resistance
though its cost might be painful or deadly in some countries and historical periods,
especially when dealing with totalitarian regimes.57
As for satire, numerous scholars have highlighted the way satire can be used as a form
of non-violent resistance against hegemony and power control in different contexts.58
Kìshtain, for example, argues that political satire has been used in the Arab world in
51C. Roach, ‘Cultural Imperialism and Resistance in Media Theory and Literary Theory’, Media, Culture & Society, 19:1 (1997),
pp. 47–66.
52Fiske, op. cit., p. 241.
53Ibid.
54J.H. Mittleman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000),
p. 169.
55T. Gournelos and V. Greene (eds) A Decade of Dark Humor: How Comedy, Irony, and Satire Shaped Post-9/11 America (Mis-
sissippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2011).
56M.J. Sorensen, ‘Humor as a Serious Strategy Of Nonviolent Resistance To Oppression’, Peace & Change, 33:2 (2008),
pp. 167–190, p. 170.
57E. Draitser, ‘Soviet Underground Jokes as a Means of Popular Entertainment’, The Journal of Popular Culture, 23:1 (1989),
pp. 117–125; E. Oring, ‘Risky Business: Political Jokes Under Repressive Regimes’, Western Folklore, (2004), pp. 209–236.
58S.B. Rodrigues and D.L. Collinson, ‘“Having Fun”?: Humour As Resistance in Brazil’, Organization Studies, 16:5 (1995),
pp. 739–768; Khalid Kìshtain, ‘Humor and Resistance in the Arab World and Greater Middle East’ in M. Stephan (ed.) Civi-
lian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009), pp. 53–63; L. Tang and S. Bhattacharya, ‘Power and Resistance: A Case Study Of Satire on the Internet’, Sociological
Research Online, 16:2 (2011), pp. ; E. Mascha, ‘Mocking Fascism Popular Culture and Political Satire’ in V. Tsakona and
D. Popa (eds) Studies in Political Humour: In Between Political Critique and Public Entertainment ( New York: John Benja-
mins, 2011); M. Sienkiewicz, ‘Out of Control: Palestinian News Satire and Government Power in the Age of Social Media’,
Popular Communication, 10:1-2 (2012), pp. 106–118; G. Yang and M. Jiang, ‘The Networked Practice of Online Political
Satire in China: Between Ritual and Resistance’, International Communication Gazette, 77:3 (2015), pp. 215–231
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critiquing politics, and many well-known political leaders like the former Egyptian leader
Jamal Abdul Nasser was not exempted from jokes and humorous attacks.
In addition to its entertainment quality, humor, in general, vents negative emotions and
provides liberating feelings because it empowers people in expressing their frustrations
towards the shortcomings of the political, religious, or social system. In this regard,
Freud emphasized the aggressive nature of jokes and how they can have an impact on indi-
viduals, while other scholars discussed the importance of the incongruence elements in
making jokes popular in different platforms including social media.59 Further, Lindvall
chronicles the history of humor and ﬁnds that each age has its own distinct type of reli-
gious satire. Here, a satirist is deﬁned as a person who ‘plays the role of a trickster, but with
a purpose’.60 Further, Kuipers61 focuses on the importance of social background and glo-
balization in perceiving good and bad humor. In other words, humor remains relative
because it is bound by cultural values. For example, Lewis stresses that humor in the
USA is viewed from partisan perspectives as it seems to be divisive, but he asserts that
‘much of our joking has serious objectives that can elicit acquiescence or resistance’.62
Also, the Danish cartoons that mocked Muhammed, the Prophet of Islam, were regarded
as humorous by some in the West, yet the majority of Muslims’ reactions towards these
cartoons were ‘totally devoid of any humor’.63
As stated above, humor is a form of cultural resistance against hegemonic powers. For
instance, the Serbian Otpor movement relied on humor to topple the rule Slobodan Milo-
ševic´ .64 In his study of sarsart.org which contains digital artworks that were made as a
reaction to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, Gillett stresses the
importance of the Internet as a means for cultural resistance, stating: ‘Like forms of cul-
tural resistance generally, the Internet gives a forum for those who are silenced or margin-
alized to express their views publicly in ways that would not otherwise be available’.65
Indeed, humor is regarded as an effective means of non-violent resistance,66 and it is a uni-
versal trait as the use of humor to express political and cultural struggle or resistance is
documented in Mexico,67 Syria,68 and Egypt during the Arab Spring.69 It is also often
used by African Americans as a way to assert their Black identity in a hegemonic white
59E. Oring, Jokes and their Relations (: University Press of Kentucky, 1992); Engaging Humor (: University of Illinois Press,
2003); L. Shifman and M. Blondheim, ‘The medium is the joke: Online humor about and by networked computers’,
New Media & Society, (2010), pp. ; A.E. Holton and S.C. Lewis, ‘Journalists, Social Media, and the use of Humor on
Twitter’, Electronic Journal of Communication, 21:1/2 (2011), ; P.D. da Silva and J.L. Garcia, ‘YouTubers as Satirists’, eJournal
of eDemocracy & Open Government, 4:1 (2012), .
60T. Lindvall, God Mocks: A History of Religious Satire from the Hebrew Prophets to Stephen Colbert (New York: NYU Press,
2015), p. 2.
61G. Kuipers, Good Humor, Bad Taste: A Sociology of the Joke (: Walter de Gruyter, 2015).
62P. Lews, Cracking Up: American Humor in a Time of Conﬂict (: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 2.
63C. Davies, G. Kuipers, P. Lewis, R.A. Martin, E. Oring and V. Raskin, ‘The Muhammad Cartoons and Humor Research: A
Collection Of Essays’, Humor: International Journal of Humor Research, 21:1 (2008), pp. 1–46, p. 41.
64Sorensen, op. cit.
65J. Gillett, ‘Internet Web Logs As Cultural Resistance: A Study of the SARS Arts Project’, Journal of Communication Inquiry,
31:1 (2007), pp. 28–43, p. 30.
66Sorensen, op. cit.; C. Zelizer, ‘Laughing our Way to Peace or War: Humour and Peacebuilding’, Journal of Conﬂictology, 1:2
(2010), .
67S. Schmidt, Seriously Funny: Mexican Political Jokes as Social Resistance (: University of Arizona Press, 2014).
68L. Wedeen, ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from Syria’, Critical Inquiry, 39:4 (2013), pp. 841–873.
69M.M. Helmy and S. Frerichs, ‘Stripping the Boss: The Powerful Role Of Humor in the Egyptian Revolution 2011’, Integrative
Psychological and Behavioral Science, 47:4 (2013), pp. 450–481.
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culture.70 I argue here that the numerous TV shows and YouTube videos that are called
‘Salil Al Sawarem: The popular edition’ that mock ISIS and its media productions function
as cultural, religious, and political resistance against ISIS’s ideology and its attempt to
expand in other countries. The section below is focused on presenting these media pro-
ductions that are related to anti-ISIS humor.
Non-violent Resistance Against ISIS
When ISIS advanced into parts of Iraq and Syria, it caused a huge humanitarian crisis
because millions of people were forced to ﬂee.71 For example, thousands of Yazidi
women from Iraq were enslaved and raped by the group.72 As it is well publicized,
ISIS’s expansion was met with armed confrontation from a US-led Coalition as well as
Shiite militias and the Iraqi army. However, there are numerous other non-military and
non-violent types of resistance against ISIS,73 which are regarded as forms of cultural
resistance that will be the focus of this study. For example, GhostSec, which is a
hacking group involving many Arabs from various countries, has been formed whose
goal is to attack ISIS’s websites and social media accounts in what is described as a
‘counter-terrorism operation’.74 According to its website, the group’s ‘mission is to elim-
inate the online presence of Islamic extremist groups… in an effort to stymie their recruit-
ment and limit their ability to organize international terrorist efforts.75 Also, the hacktivist
group, Anonymous, announced its ongoing online attacks against ISIS’s websites and its
followers on Twitter. The group was allegedly successful in taking down over 750 Twitter
accounts, some of which had more than 10,000 followers.76
Other forms of cultural resistance include the case of Aeham Ahmed, a Palestinian
refugee whose piano was destroyed by ISIS when they advanced into Yarmouk city, a
refugee enclave in Syria. ISIS burnt Aeham’s piano because music is regarded as a sin,
and they threatened to kill him, saying: ‘Shut up or I will throw you on top and burn
you along with it!’. Instead of complying, Aeham continued playing music on his keyboard
despite the risks because ‘music brings peace’, according to him.77 Similar to Aeham
Ahmed, an Iraqi artist called Akeel Khreef used old and torn shoes to mock ISIS. The
artist admits that his non-violent means of countering the terrorist group ‘will not get
70C. Bailey, ‘Fight the Power: African American Humor as a Discourse of Resistance’, The Western Journal of Black Studies,
36:4 (2012), pp. , p. 253.
71Fazel Hawramy, ‘Winter brings fresh threat to Iraq’s refugees who ﬂed the Isis advance’, The Guardian, 6 December 2014,
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/06/winter-threat-iraq-refugees-kurdish-region-camps-isis; UNHCR, ‘Sharp
increase in Iraqi refugees ﬂeeing ISIS into Jordan and Turkey’, 23 September 2014, www.unhcr.org/54214cfe9.html
72Raya Jalabi, ‘Who are the Yazidis and Why is Isis Hunting Them?’, The Guardian, 11 August 2014, www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/aug/07/who-yazidi-isis-iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains; Richard Spencer, ‘Iraq crisis: UN condemns “war
crimes” as another town falls to Isis’, The Guardian, 16 June 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
iraq/10904414/Iraq-crisis-UN-condemns-war-crimes-as-another-town-falls-to-Isis.html
73Sophia Jones, ‘“SNL” Has Nothing On The Way The Middle East Mocks ISIS’, The Hufﬁngton Post, 3 March 2015, www.
hufﬁngtonpost.com/2015/03/03/mocking-islamic-state_n_6790254.html
74L. Tzach, ‘Miss Jordan 2010 is Fighting Islamic Extremists Online’, Vocativ, 9 July 2015, www.vocativ.com/news/209255/
isis-beauty-queen-hacktivist-ﬁghting-islamic-state/
75L. Tzach and G. Shiloach, ‘Anonymous Faction Launches Attacks Against ISIS’, Vocativ, 1 July 2015, www.vocativ.com/
news/207207/anonymous-faction-launches-attack-against-isis/
76‘Anonymous Targets IS Sympathisers on Twitter’, BBC News online, 21 July 2015, www.bbc.com/news/technology-
33608369; G. Shiloach, ‘ISIS Is Being Attacked By Anonymous’, Vocativ, 2 July 2015, www.vocativ.com/world/isis-2/isis-
anonymous/
77S. Abdelaziz, ‘ISIS Tried To Silence Him, But Pianist Won’t Stay Quiet’, CNN, 2 September 2015, www.cnn.com/2015/09/02/
middleeast/isis-syria-yarmouk-piano-player/
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them out of my country with this work, but … I am certain they would be embarrassed by
it’.78 Finlay, an Iraqi cartoonist called Diyaa Al-Hajjar, routinely publishes works in main-
stream Iraqi media that mock ISIS and its ideology. For example, he once produced a
cartoon featuring
a towering cleric in traditional Arabic dress [who] removes the brains from subservient
donkey-eared jihadists and replaces them with bombs. The newly programmed, black-clad
ﬁghters rush off to battle, wielding a scimitar in each hand.79
The cartoon mocks the stupidity of ISIS members and is regarded as an attack against the
alleged support ISIS gets from some Gulf Arab countries.
In relation to social media use, there are many other efforts to counter ISIS’s ideology
such as the famous Twitter account that is called ‘ISIS Karaoke’ (twitter.com/isis_karaoke)
which comically shows ISIS ﬁghters signing love songs instead of delivering their threaten-
ing speeches. Another campaign that became viral is a Twitter hashtag called #SorryISIS in
which people from around the world started mocking ISIS for its call to join the group.
However, it also led to suspending the Twitter account of an Arab Spring activist
whose name was Iyad El Baghdadi.80
In fact, the viral campaigns against ISIS were not only global but also national. For example,
the comedy show, Saturday Night Live, once featured Dakota Johnston as a young girl who
says goodbye to her father in order to join ISIS.81 Another viral video posted from Mexico
Table 1. Top ten anti-ISIS YouTube videos.
Rank Link
No. of
views
No. of
likes
No. of
dislikes
No. of
comments Date posted
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
exMS5HkfCFA
888,852 1588 1899 1022 1 March
2015
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GZCT6013Skg
633,914 2538 808 664 22 Feb 2015
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
gdmwemv7ixc
256,569 541 137 81 17 March
2015
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
fd5v_dVZp8
240,173 364 584 181 3 March
2015
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
BFQiEz1yyOw
201,423 813 150 No comments 27 Feb 2015
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
357cbgFdp1c
173,531 412 99 36 27 Feb 2015
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
fQEV-FrY568
159,986 253 209 11 23 Feb 2015
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
hqgEIVrQSd0
132,127 1071 285 89 4 March
2015
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
XBJ-WbbV-Es
135,090 155 131 52 2 March
2015
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
050ybAbpMOU
119,622 22 146 92 25 Feb 2015
78A. Karim, ‘Iraqi Artist Gets Creative With Old Shoes To Mock ISIS’, Al Arabiya, 1 February, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/
en/life-style/art-and-culture/2015/02/01/Iraqi-artist-gets-creative-with-old-shoes-to-mock-ISIS-.html
79Dominique Soguel, ‘Fighting Horror with Humor, Iraqis Retaliate against Islamic State’, The Christian Science Monitor, 1
October 2014, www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/1001/Fighting-horror-with-humor-Iraqis-retaliate-against-
Islamic-State
80‘Twitter “Confuses” Iyad El Baghdadi With Islamic State Leader’, BBC News online, 1 January 2016, www.bbc.com/news/
world-35210527
81 Elizabeth Nicholas, ‘Can We Just Laugh Off ISIS?’, Vice, 25 July 2015, www.vice.com/en_ca/read/can-we-just-laugh-off-
isis-235
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showed a group of Mexican men parodying an ISIS execution scene.82 Also, the hacktivist
group Anonymous announced on 11 December 2015 its #trollingday campaign in which
the group urged its followers to use the hashtag #Daeshbags in order to mock ISIS on
social media. The original idea began when the bulletin board 4chan showed how they super-
imposed duck heads on the pictures of Isis ﬁghters.83 Anonymous later explained that the idea
behind organizing the campaign was related to showing ISIS that ‘we are not afraid, we will
not just hide in our fear, we are the majority and with our strength in numbers we can make a
real difference’.84 In this campaign, three recurrent themes were highlighted such as claiming
that ISIS members were ‘secretly gay, that they like to have sex with goats, or something to do
with rubber ducks.85 Indeed, there are numerous other examples that ridiculed ISIS which can
be found in different parts of the world; many of them can be categorized as forms of cultural
resistance against ISIS’s ideology. This article examines another type of cultural resistance ISIS
faces in different Arab countries by focusing on TV shows and YouTube videos, as will be
explained below.
Figure 1. The most viewed video on anti-ISIS humor.
82‘Mexicans Mock ISIS with Video Parody of Execution and Song about a Sea Snake’, Irish Daily Star, 2015, http://thestar.ie/
watch-mexicans-mock-isis-with-video-parody-of-execution-and-song-about-a-sea-snake/
83Joel Gunter, ‘Isis Mocked with Rubber Ducks As Internet Fights Terror with Humour’, The Guardian, 28 November 2015,
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/28/isis-ﬁghters-rubber-ducks-reddit-4chan
84Brian Mastroianni, ‘Anonymous Hackers Declare Friday “Troll ISIS Day”, CBS News, 9 December 2015, www.cbsnews.com/
news/anonymous-declares-friday-troll-isis-day/
85 Kevin Collier, ‘Anonymous Announces “Trolling ISIS Day” to Mock the Islamic State’, DailyDot.com, 8 December 2015,
www.dailydot.com/politics/anonymous-trolling-day-isis-islamic-state/
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The Anti-ISIS Videos
By using the search term ‘Salil Al Sawarem’ in Arabic on 9 September 2015, the top ten
videos dealing with anti-ISIS humor were selected based on their number of views (see
Table 1). The results were recorded on the same day because social media data changes
with time, and since this is a qualitative study that relies on interpretive assessment, the
quantitative part is only used to provide an overview of the top videos that deal with
anti-ISIS humor. Only the top videos are included because there are hundreds of
similar clips that have not garnered the same public attention. YouTube is selected
because of its popularity and the fact that it is a global video platform.86 There are numer-
ous qualitative and quantitative studies that used popular YouTube videos and comments
in order to assess the online public’s views and sentiments towards social movements,
trends, and important world events.87
Figure 2. A scene from the satirical Saudi TV show, Selﬁe.
86Burgess & Green, 2013
87C. Tryon, ‘Pop Politics: Online Parody Videos, Intertextuality, and Political Participation’, Popular Communication, 6:4
(2008), pp. 209–213; K. Andén-Papadopoulos, ‘US Soldiers Imaging the Iraq War on YouTube ’, Popular Communication,
7:1 (2009), pp. 17–27; L. Van Zoonen, F. Vis and S. Mihelj, ‘Performing Citizenship on YouTube: Activism, Satire and Online
Debate Around the Anti-Islam Video Fitna’, Critical Discourse Studies, 7:4 (2010), pp. 249–262; L. Mosemghvdlishvili and
J. Jansz, ‘Framing and Praising Allah on YouTube: Exploring User-Created Videos about Islam and the Motivations for
Producing them’, New Media & Society, 15:4 (2013), pp. 482–500; M. Thelwall, P. Sud and F. Vis, ‘Commenting on
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Most of the anti-ISIS videos examined in this study seem to be edited and dubbed as
they are taken from various older movies and songs performed by a variety of Arab
actors and singers. Video clip (1) got the highest number of views (888,852), dislikes
(1899), as well as comments and replies (1022). This video uses the term DAESH
which is the Arabic acronym of ISIS, a term detested by the terrorist group. It features
a famous belly dancer called Saffynaz, dancing on the tunes of the edited version of
ISIS’s ‘Salil Al-Sawarem’ (see Figure 1). One of the reasons behind this high number of
dislikes is the belief that the clip is profane since ISIS uses Islamic terms in its chant. In
total, the top ten videos generated 2,941,287 views, 7,757 likes (63.5 per cent), 4,448 dis-
likes (36.4 per cent), and 2,228 comments and replies which indicate the high amount of
public engagement.
Figure 3. Al Iraqiya TV series featuring Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.
YouTube Videos: From Guatemalan Rock to el big bang’, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Tech-
nology, 63:3 (2012), pp. 616–629; A.K. Al-Rawi, ‘The Anti-Terrorist Advertising Campaigns in the Middle East’, Journal of
International Communication, 19 (2013), pp. 182–195; ‘Online Reactions to the Muhammad Cartoons: YouTube and the
Virtual Ummah’, Journal for the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion, 54 (2015), pp. 261–276; A.J. Terry, ‘The Church Made Me Do It:
Identity and Apology in Marin Foundation Video Confessionals’, Journal of Communication Inquiry, 39:4 (2015), pp. 298–
318; M.K. Park, ‘Psy-Zing up the Mainstreaming of “Gangnam Style”: Embracing Asian Masculinity as Neo-Minstrelsy?’,
Journal of Communication Inquiry, 39:3 (2015), pp. 195–212; M.A. Shapiro and H.W. Park, ‘More than Entertainment:
YouTube and Public Responses to the Science Of Global Warming and Climate Change’, Social Science Information, 54
(2015), pp. 115–145.
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Based on the ﬁgures provided above, these decentralized anti-ISIS and humorous
videos are engaging and effective public diplomacy efforts against this terrorist group.
In this regard, Philip Seib discusses how public diplomacy or soft power can be used to
counter terrorism. He says, for example, that the production of the Palestinian Shara’a
Simsim that started airing in 2006 as an adaptation of Sesame Street became a crucial
tool in countering violent ideology. The same children’s show was also used in other
places like Northern Ireland and Kosovo that witnessed previous violence.88 In this
regard, the Saudi government has been running the Assakina Campaign for Dialogue
that is supervised by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The media campaign aims at dis-
crediting extremist ideology by engaging radical youth in religious debates.89 Further, the
Jordanian government ran a public campaign against Al-Qaeda after the 2005 hotel
bombing in Amman,90 and Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria frequently aired public aware-
ness ads to counter religious extremism.91
Figure 4. LBC TV show on mocking ISIS.
88P. Seib, ‘Public Diplomacy Versus Terrorism in D. Freedman and D. Thussu (eds) Media & Terrorism: Global Perspectives
(Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2012), pp. 63–76, pp. 69–70).
89 ‘A Special Study by Assakina: Terrorists’ Websites Lose their Scientiﬁc Glamour’, Assakina, 30 July 2012, www.assakina.
com/news/news3/17085.html
90Mark Lynch, ‘Public Opinion Survey Research and Public Diplomacy in Joshua S. Fouts (ed.) Public Diplomacy: Practitioners,
Policy Makers, and Public Opinion, Public Diplomacy and World Public Opinion Forum, April 9–11, Washington, Pew
Research Center, p. 39.
91Al-Dunya, ‘Terrorism: I’m Syrian, I’m against it’, YouTube, 22 April 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhxatFakQOU
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In relation to ISIS, several Arab governments have been involved in such counter-ter-
rorism and anti-radicalization activities. For example, the Saudi-run television, MBC, pro-
duced and aired the anti-ISIS show ‘Selﬁe’.92 As a result, the Saudi actor, Nasr Al-Qasabi,
received numerous death threats by ISIS followers and sympathizers on Twitter because he
was the show’s lead actor (see Figure 2).93 The word itself is a pun playing on the Arabic
word salaﬁ (ultra-orthodox Islamist) and the word Selﬁe. Al-Qasabi emphasized in an
interview that his role as an actor in this show is to expose ISIS’s reality: ‘it’s a price we
have to pay. If we were not serious about showing [reality], we would have remained
[idle] at our homes.’94 In this regard, the regional director of the Saudi-MBC once revealed
to a US diplomat that one of the main goals of the MBC channels is to enhance ‘“moder-
ate” perspectives among the country’s youth’.95
Figure 5. LBC TV featuring Abu Bakr Baghdadi.
92Alma Al Turkmani, ‘Saudi TV Deploys New Weapon against ISIS: Satire’, CNN, 22 June 105, www.cnn.com/2015/06/22/
middleeast/anti-isis-satire/
93Aisha Gani, ‘Saudi Comedian Laughs Off Threats Over Isis Satire’, The Guardian, 24 June 2015, www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/jun/24/saudi-comedian-laughs-off-threats-isis-satire
94‘The Saudi Actor Nasr Al-Qasabi: Death Threats Because Of Selﬁe Show Do Not Fear Me’, BBC Arabic, 23 June 2015, www.
bbc.com/arabic/artandculture/2015/06/150623_saudi_nasser_alqasaby_mocks_isis
95 Wikileaks, ‘Ideological and Ownership Trends in the Saudi Media’, 09RIYADH651 May 11. E.O. 12958. Embassy Riyadh,
2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09RIYADH651.html
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Another popular anti-ISIS TV series was produced by the Iraqi national television, Al
Iraqiya. It is called ‘The Mythical State’ (Doulatt al-Khuraffa) which is an intended distor-
tion of ‘The Caliphate State’ (Doulatt Al-Khilaffa). The series’ trailer highlights Abu Bakr
Al-Baghdadi as can be seen in Image (3), and its main goal is to ridicule ISIS and its ideol-
ogy.96 In relation to the concept of cultural resistance, the series’ director, Ali Al-Qasim,
stated: ‘We are not good at carrying arms, but we know how to undermine ISIS’s ideology
with our work’.97 The Iraqi TV show also ‘took a jab at the CIA, Israel, and the Gulf mon-
archies, a trio that many Iraqis hold responsible for the rise of the demonic group’.98
Finally, the Lebanese TV station, LBC, aired a TV series show called ‘Kttir Selbi’ (Very
Negative) in which ISIS ﬁghters are presented in awkward situations and are made fun
of especially in relation to the contrast between their extremist ideology that enforces
female niqab and encounters with women that often allude to sex. For example, in one
show some ISIS ﬁghters plan to assassinate the famous Lebanese singer, Haifa Wahbi,
but they completely change their minds after seeing her sexy body and moves (see
Figure 4). In another show, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is presented getting a shoulder
message by an attractive young woman wearing a short “dress” (see Figure 5). In this
regard, the Lebanese producer, Nabil Assaf, stated that ISIS ﬁghters ‘are not a true
Figure 6. The Kurdish ‘The program program’ show that mocks the stupidity of ISIS ﬁghters.
96J. Al-Hattab, ‘Doulatt al-Khuraffa Show … This is How Iraqis Mock ISIS’, Al Arabiya, 29 September 2015, www.alarabiya.
net/ar/last-page/2014/09/29/- ﺩﻭﻟﺔ-ﺍﳋﺮﺍﻓﺔ-ﻓﻴﺪﻳﻮ-ﻛﻠﻴﺒ-ﻋﺮﺍﻗﻴ-ﻳﺴﺨﺮ-ﻣﻨ-ﺍﻟﺪﻭﺍﻋﺸ .html
97‘Doulatt al-Khuraffa: An Iraqi Comedy that Mocks DAESH’, RT, 30 September 2014 http://arabic.rt.com/news/760062- ﺩﻭﻟﺔ-
ﺍﳋﺮﺍﻓﺔ-ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻠ-ﻋﺮﺍﻗﻴ-ﻛﻮﻣﻴﺪﻳ-ﺩﺍﻋﺸ /
98Soguel, op. cit.
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representation of Islam and so by mocking them, it is a way to show that we are against
them’.99
Finally, another anti-ISIS weekly TV show was aired by the Iraqi Kurdsat TV channel in
Kurdish in 2014. The show is called ‘The program program’, featuring a famous song that
mocks ISIS by emphasizing the group’s savagery, stupidity, and backwardness.100 For
example, the song mentions that ISIS members milk a goat even if it is a male and that
ISIS ﬁghters have no brains (See Figure 6).101 The name of the Kurdish show is apparently
borrowed from the satirical Egyptian TV program that was presented by Bassem Youssif
in which he imitated Jon Stewart.102 This show is another representative example of the
way people from the Middle East are ﬁghting ISIS ‘not with guns, bombs, or munitions
… [but] with humor’.103
In brief, the centralized and non-centralized anti-ISIS cultural media productions pre-
sented above can be regarded as public diplomacy and cultural resistance activities which
aim at countering radical ideology by ridiculing and discrediting ISIS’s claims. The videos
posted on YouTube in relation to ‘Salil Al Sawarem: The popular edition’ mock ISIS and
its media productions, and they manifest cultural, religious, and political forms of resist-
ance. Whether a centralized media production or not, anti-ISIS humor is an important
non-violent means to express the rejection of the terrorist group’s violence and extremism.
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